

Security Considerations

This memo does not address the security aspects of the issues discussed.

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9 Summary

Along with the emergence of very high speed applications and media, resource management has become a critical issue in the Research Internet and internets in general. A fundamental characteristic of the resource management problem is allowing administratively disjoint networks to interconnect while retaining control over resource usage. However, we have lacked a careful articulation of the types of resource management policies that need to be supported. This paper addresses policy requirements for the Research Internet. After justifying our assumptions regarding network topology we presented a taxonomy and examples of policies that must be supported by a RRP protocol.

10 Acknowledgments

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is that access to an AD at any point in time is contingent upon a local, highly dynamic, parameter that is not globally available. Therefore such a policy term could well result in looping, oscillations, and excessive route (re)computation overhead, both unacceptable. Consequently this is one type of policy that routing experts suggest would be difficult to support in a very large decentralized internetwork.

- Granularity can also be problematic, but not as devastating as highly dynamic IR contingencies. Here the caution is less specific. Very fine grain policies, which restrict access to particular hosts, or are contingent upon very fine grain user class identification, may be achieved more efficiently with network level access control [11] or end system controls instead of burdening the inter-AD routing mechanism.
- Security is expensive, as always. Routing protocols are subject to fraud through impersonation, data substitution, and denial of service. Some of the proposed mechanisms provide some means for detection and non-repudiation. However, to achieve a priori prevention of resource misuse is expensive in terms of per connection or per packet cryptographic overhead. For some environments we firmly believe that this will be necessary and we would prefer an architecture that would accommodate such variability [12].

In general, it is difficult to predict the impact of any particular policy term. Tools will be needed to assist people in writing and validating policy terms.

8 Proposed mechanisms

Previous routing protocols have addressed a narrower definition of IR, as appropriate for the interests of their day. In particular, RFP[3], IOP[13], and RFP[6] incorporate a notion of policy restrictions as to where routing database information travels. None are intended to support policy based routing of packets as described here. More recent routing proposals such as Landmark[14] and Garsia[15] could be used to restrict packet forwarding but are not suited to source/destination, and some of the condition-oriented, policies. We feel these policy types are critical to support. Write that for environments (e.g., within an AD substructure) in which the simple AD topology conjecture holds true, these alternatives may be suitable.

HC110[5] provides a good description of shorter term policy routing requirements. Ban classifies three types of mechanisms, policy based distribution of route information, policy based packet forwarding, and policy based dynamic allocation of network resources. The second class is characterized by Dale Clark's IR architecture, HC110[4]. With respect to the longer term requirements laid out in this document, only this second class is expressive and flexible enough to support the multiplicity of stub and transit policies. In other words, the power of the IR approach (e.g., HC110) is not just in the added granularity of control pointed out by Ban, i.e., the ability to specify particular hosts and user classes. Its power is in the ability to express and enforce many types of stub and transit policies and apply them on a discriminatory basis to different AD. In addition, this approach provides explicit support for stub AD to control routes via the use of

Regional B

1. Regional B will carry traffic from/to any directly connected F/Re/U network to any F/Re/U network via a commercial carrier regardless of its UCI. In this case the packets are charged for since the commercial carrier charges per kilopacket.

$[Regional B : (*, \{F/Re / U\}, \{F/Re / U\})(*, \{F/Re / U\}, Cc)\{\}$
 $\{unauthenticatedUCI, per - kilopacket charge\}\{\}$

6.3.3 Campus and Private Networks

Similar interviews should be conducted with administrators of campus and private networks. However, many aspects of their policies are contingent on the still unresolved policies of the regionals and federal agencies. In any event, transit policies will be critical for campus and private networks to flexibly control access to lateral links and private wide area networks, respectively. For example, a small set of university and private laboratories may provide access to special gigabit links for particular classes of researchers. On the other hand, source/destination policies should not be used in place of network level access controls for these end A9.

6.3.4 Commercial Services

Currently commercial communication services play a low level role in most parts of today's Research Internet; they provide the transmission media, i.e., leased lines. In the future we expect commercial carriers to provide increasingly higher level and enhanced services such as high speed packet switched backbone services. Because such services are not yet part of the Research Internet infrastructure there exist no policy statements.

Charging and accounting are certain to be an important policy type in this context. Moreover, we anticipate the long haul services market to be highly competitive. This implies that competing service providers will engage in significant gaming in terms of packaging and pricing of services. Consequently, the ability to express varied and dynamic charging policies will be critical for these A9.

7 Problematic requirements

Most of this paper has lobbied for articulation of relatively detailed policy statements in order to help define the technical mechanisms needed for enforcement. We wanted a top down design process beginning with articulation of desired policies. Now we feel compelled to mention requirements that are clearly problematic from the bottom up perspective of technical feasibility

- Non-interference policies are of the form "I will provide access for principals x to resources y so long as it does not interfere with my internal usage." The problem with such policies

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

1. DARPA will carry traffic to/from any host in DARPA and from any external host that can get it there so long as UCI is research or support. No UCI authentication or per packet charge.

```
[ ARPA1: (*, *, *)(*, ARPA, -){research, support}
{unauthenticated -UCI, no per packet charge}{}]
```

2. DARPA will carry traffic for any host connected to a F/R/U/G network talking to any other host connected to a F/R/U/G via any F/R/U/G entry and exit network, so long as there is it is being used for research or support, and the network is not heavily congested!. There is no authentication of the UCI and no per packet charging. Note Darpa would like to say something about the need to enter the Darpa Ad at the point closest to the destination..but i don't know how to express this..

```
[ ARPA2: (*, {F/R/U/Co}, {F/R/U/Co})*, {F/R/U/Co}, {F/R/U/Co})
{research, support}{unauthenticated -UCI, no per packet charge,
non-interference basis}{}]
```

Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

1. DCA will not carry any transit traffic. It will only accept and send traffic to and from its mail bridge(s) and only forward to hosts on other F/R/Us. All packets are marked and charged for by the kilopacket.

```
[ CA1: (mail bridge, CA, -)(*, {F/Re}, {F/Re}){research, support}
{unauthenticated UCI, all in com ing packets marked, per -kilopacket ch
```

6.3.2 The Regionals

Interv

Department of Energy (DOE)

1. DOE will carry traffic to and from any host directly connected to DOE so long as it is used for research or support. There is no authentication of the UC and no per packet charging.

[OE1: (*, OE, -)(* , * , *){research, support }
{unauthenticatedUCI, no -per -packetcharge }{ }]

2. DOE will carry traffic for any host connected to a F/Re network talking to any other host connected to a F/Re via any F/Re entry and exit network without regard to the UC. There is no authentication of the UC and no per packet charging (in other words DOE is more restrictive with its own traffic than with traffic it is carrying as part of a resource sharing arrangement.)

[OE2: (*, {F/Re }, {F/Re })(* , {F/Re }, {F/Re }){ }
{unauthenticatedUCI, no -per -pktcharge }{ }]

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

1. NASA will accept any traffic to/from members of the NASA AD Bt no transit. No UC authentication and no per packet charge.

[NASA1: (*, *, *)(*, Nasa, -){Nasa -research, support }
{unauthenticatedUCI, no -per -packet -charge }{ }]

2. NASA will carry transit traffic to/from other federal agency networks if it is in support of research, and if the total use of available BW by non-NASA federal agencies is below non-interference policy type needs some more work in terms of integrating it into the routing algorithm. See Section 7.

[NASA2: (*, {F}, *)(*, {F}, *){research, support }
{per -packet accounting, limited to n% of available BW}{ }]

3. NASA will carry commercial traffic to federal and regional and university ADs for NASA research or support. Bt it will not allow transit. The particular entry AD is not important.

[NASA3: (*, {Co}, *)(*, {F/R/U}, *){NASA research, support }
{unauthenticatedUCI, no per packet charge }{ }]

4. On a case by case basis NASA may provide access to its resources on a cost reimbursed basis. Transit traffic will not be carried on this basis.

[NASA4: (*, *, -)(* , * , -){ }
{per -packet -charge, limited to n% of available BW}{ }]

for Regional, University, Commercial Corporation, and Commercial Carrier. A hyphen, -, means no applicable matches.

By examining a PTE we can identify the type of policy represented, as per the taxonomy presented earlier.

- If an AD specifies a policy term that has a null (-) entry for the ADexit, then it is disallowing transit for some group of users, and it is a transit policy.
- If an AD specifies a policy term that lists itself explicitly as ADsrc or ADdst, it is expressing restrictions on who can access particular resources within its boundaries, or on who inside can obtain external access. In other words the AD is expressing a source/destination policy.
- If ADexit or ADtr is specified then the policy expressed is an exit/entrance path policy.
- If the global conditions include charging, QoS, resource guarantee, time of day, higher level application, resource limit, or authentication related information it is obviously a charging, QoS, resource guarantee, temporal, higher level application, resource limit, or authentication policy, respectively.

As seen below any one PTE typically incorporates a combination of policy types.

6.3.1 The FRI CC

In the following examples all policies (and PEs) are symmetrical under the assumption that communication is symmetrical.

National Science Foundation (NSF)

1. NSF will carry traffic for any host connected to a F/Re network talking to any other host connected to a F/Re via any F/Re entry and exit network, so long as there is it is being used for research or support. There is no authentication of the UC and no per packet charging. NSFnet is a backbone and so does not connect directly to universities or companies... thus the indication of {F/Re} instead of {F/Re/UC} as ADsrc and ADdst.

[NSF 1: (*, {F/Re}, {F/Re})*, {F/Re}, {F/Re}]{research, support}
 {unauthenticatedUCI, no-per-pkt-charge}{}}

2. NSF will carry traffic to user and expert services hosts in NSF AD to/from any F/Re AD via any F/Re AD. These are the only things that directly connect to NSFnet.

[NSF 2: ({Usersvcs, ExpertSvcs}, {NSF}, {F/Re})*, {F/Re}, {-}]{}}{}}

6.2 Taxonomy of Charging Policies

Subband transit charging policies may specify the following parameters:

- **Unit of accounting** (eg, dollars or credits).
- **Basis for charging** (eg, per byte or per bit).
- **Actual charges** (eg, actual rates such as \$.50/byte).
- **Who is charged or paid** (eg, originator of packet, immediate neighbor from whom packet was received, destination of packet, a third party collection agent).
- **Whose packet count is used** (eg, source, destination, the transit ADs on court, the cut of source upstream or downstream).
- **Bound on charges** (eg, to limit the amount that a stub AD is willing to spend, or the amount that a transit AD is willing to carry)

The enforcement of these policies may be carried out during route synthesis or route selection [4].

6.3 Example Policy statements

The following policy statements were collected in the fall of 1988 through interviews with representatives of the federal agencies most involved in supporting internetworking. Once again we emphasize that these are *not official policy statements*. They are presented here to provide concrete examples of the sort of policies that agencies would like to enforce.

Expressing policies as Policy Terms (PTs) Each policy is described in English and then expressed in a *policy term (PT)* notation suggested by Dale Clark in [4]. Each PT represents a distinct policy of the AD that synthesized it. The format of a PT is:

$$[(H_{src}, A_{src}, A_{ent}), (H_{dst}, A_{dst}, A_{exit}), UCI, Cg, Cb]$$

H_{src} stands for source host, A_{src} for source AD, A_{ent} for entering AD (i.e., neighboring AD from which traffic is arriving directly), H_{dst} for destination host, A_{dst} for destination AD, A_{exit} for exit AD (i.e., neighboring AD to which traffic is going directly), UCI for user class identifier, and Cg and Cb for global and bilateral conditions, respectively. The purpose of a PT is to specify that packets from source host, H_{src} (or a group of hosts) in a source AD A_{src} , are allowed to enter the AD in question via some directly connected AD A_{ent} , and exit through another directly connected AD A_{exit} , on its way to a host, H_{dst} (or a group of hosts) in some destination AD A_{dst} . User Class Identifier (UCI) allow for distinguishing between various user classes, e.g., General, Research, Commercial, Contract, etc. Global Conditions (Cg) represent billing and other variables. Bilateral Conditions (Cb) relate to agreements between neighboring ADs, e.g., related to metering or charging. In the example policy terms provided below we make use of the following abbreviations: FAC for {IOE/NSA/ICANSE}, F for Federal Agency Re

reject a route based on any AD (or combination of ADs) in the route. Similarly, a transit AD could express a packet forwarding policy that behaves differently depending upon which AD a packet has passed through, and is going to pass through, en route to the destination. Less ambitious (and perhaps more reasonable) path-sensitive policies might only discriminate according to the immediate neighbor AD through which the packet is traveling (i.e., a stub network could reject a route based on the first transit AD in the route, and a transit AD could express a packet forwarding policy that depends upon the previous, and the subsequent, transit AD in the route.)

- **Quality/Type of Service (QoS or TOS)**
This type of policy restricts access to special resources or services. For example, a special high throughput, low delay link may be made available on a selective basis.
- **Resource Guarantee**
These policies provide a guaranteed percentage of a resource on a selective, as needed basis. In other words, the resource can be used by others if the preferred ADs offered load is below the guaranteed level of service. The guarantee may be to always carry intra-AD traffic or to always carry inter-AD traffic for a specific AD.
- **Temporal**
Temporal policies restrict usage based on the time of day or other time related parameters.
- **High Level Protocol**
Usage may be restricted to a specific high level protocol such as mail or file transfer. (Alternatively, such policies can be implemented as source/destination policies by configuring a host(s) within an AD as an application relay and composing policy terms that allow inter-AD access to only that host.)
- **Resource limit**
There may be a limit on the amount of traffic load a source may generate during a particular time interval, e.g., so many packets in a day, hour, or minute.
- **Authentication requirements**
Conditions may be specified regarding the authenticity of principal identifying information. Some ADs might require some form of cryptographic proof as to the identity and affiliations of the principal before providing access to critical resources.

The above policy types usually exist in combination for a particular AD i.e., an ADs policies might express a combination of transit, source/destination, and QoS restrictions. This taxonomy will evolve as RR is applied to other domains.

As will be seen in Section 6.3 an AD can express its charging and access policies in a single syntax. Moreover, both stub and transit policies can coexist. This is important since some ADs operate as both stub and transit facilities and require such hybrid control.

6 Policy types

This section outlines a taxonomy of internet policies for inter-AD topologies that allow lateral and bypass links. The taxonomy is intended to cover a wide range of AD and internets. Any particular architecture we design should support a significant subset of these policy types but may not support all of them due to technical complexity and performance considerations. The general taxonomy is important input to a functional specification for RR. Moreover, it can be used to evaluate and compare the suitability and completeness of existing routing architectures and protocols for RR, see Section 8.

We provide examples from the Research Internet of the different policy types in the form of resource usage policy statements. These statements were collected through interviews with agency representatives, but they *do not* represent official policy. These sample policy statements should *not* be interpreted as agency policy; they are provided here only as examples.

Internet policies fall into two classes, access and charging. Access policies specify who can use resources and under what conditions. Charging policies specify the metering, accounting and billing implemented by a particular AD.

6.1 Taxonomy of Access Policies

We have identified the following types of access policies that AD may wish to enforce. Charging policies are described in the subsequent section. Section 6.3 provides more specific examples of both access and charging policies using RRC policy statements.

Access policies typically are expressed in the form *principals of type x can have access to resources of type y under the following conditions, z*. The policies are categorized below according to the definition of y and z. In any particular instance, each of the policy types would be further qualified by definition of legitimate principals, x, i.e., what characteristics x must have in order to access the resource in question.

We refer to access policies described by stub and transit AD. The two roles imply different motivations for resource control, however the types of policies expressed are similar; we expect the supporting mechanism to be common as well.

Stub and transit access policies may specify any of the following parameters:

- **Source/Destination**

Source/Destination policies prevent or restrict communication originated by or destined for particular AD (or hosts or user classes within an AD).

- **Path**

Path sensitive policies specify which AD may or may not be passed through en route to a destination. The most general path sensitive policies allow stub and transit AD to express policies that depend on *any component* in the AD path. In other words, a stub AD could

the complex case, lateral connections must be supported, along with the means to control the use of such connections in the routing protocols.

The different topologies imply different policy requirements. The first model assumes that all policies can be expressed and enforced in terms of dollars and cents and distributed charging schemes. The second model assumes that ASs want more varied control over their resources, control that can not be captured in a dollars and cents metric alone. We describe the types of policies to be supported and provide examples in the following section, Section 6. In brief, given private lateral links, ASs must be able to express access and charging related restrictions and privileges that discriminate on an AD basis. These policies will be diverse, dynamic, and new requirements will emerge over time, consequently support must be extensible. For example, the packaging and charging schemes of any single long haul service will vary over time and may be relatively elaborate (e.g., many tiers of service, special package deals, to achieve price discrimination).

Note that these assumptions about complexity do not preclude some collection of ASs from "negotiating away" their policy differences, i.e., forming a federation, and coordinating a simplified

to topology and policy. They contend that in the long term the following three conditions will prevail:

- The public carriers will provide pervasive, competitively priced, high speed data services.
- The resulting topology of AD will be stub (not transit) AD connected to regional backbones, which in turn interconnect via multiple, overlapping long haul backbones, i.e., a hierarchy with no lateral connections between stub AD or regionals, and no vertical bypass links.
- The policy requirements of the backbone and stub AD will be based only on charging for resource usage at the stub AD to backbone AD boundary, and to settling accounts between neighboring backbone providers (regional to long haul, and long haul to long haul).

Under these assumptions, the primary requirement for general AD interconnect is a routing and charging protocol. The routing decision can be modeled as a simple least cost path with the metric in dollars and cents. In other words, restrictions on access to transit services will be minimal and the functionality provided by the routing protocol need not be changed significantly from current day approaches.

Complex AD topology and policy model The counter argument is that a more complex AD topology will persist.¹⁰ The different assumptions about AD topology lead to the significantly different assumptions about AD policies.

This model assumes that the topology of AD will in many respects agree with the previous model of increased commercial carrier participation and resulting hierarchical structure. However, we anticipate unavoidable and persistent exceptions to the hierarchy. We assume that there will be a relatively small number of long haul transit AD (on the order of 100), but that there may be tens of thousands of regional AD and hundreds of thousands of stub AD (e.g., campuses, laboratories, and private companies). The competing long haul offerings will differ, both in the services provided and in their packaging and pricing. Regional networks will overlap less and will connect campus and private company networks. However, many stub AD will retain some private lateral links for political, technical, and reliability reasons. For example, political incentives cause organizations to invest in bypass links to

laboratory. They reside in a campus AD along with users who are legitimate users of other AD resources. Moreover, any one person may be a legitimate user of multiple AD resources under varying conditions and constraints (see examples in section 6). In addition, users can move from one AD to another. In other words, a user's rights can not be determined solely based on the AD from which the user's communications originate. Consequently, RR must not only identify resources, it must identify *principals*⁸ and associate different capabilities and rights with different principals.

One way of reducing the compromise of autonomy associated with interconnection is to implement mechanisms that assure *accountability* for resources used. Accountability may be enforced a priori, e.g., access control mechanisms applied before resource usage is permitted. Alternatively, accountability may be enforced after the fact, e.g., record keeping or metering that supports detection and provides evidence to third parties (i.e., non-repudiation). Accountability mechanisms can also be used to provide feedback to users as to consumption of resources. Internally an AD often decides to do away with such feedback under the premise that communication is a global good and should not be inhibited. There is not necessarily a "global good" across AD boundaries. Therefore, it becomes more appropriate to have resource usage visible to users, whether or not actual charging for usage takes place. Another motivation that drives the need for accountability across AD boundaries is the greater variability in implementations. Different implementations of a single network protocol can vary greatly as to their efficiency[8]. We can not assure control over implementation across AD boundaries. Feedback mechanisms such as metering (and charging in some cases) would introduce a concrete incentive for ADs to employ efficient and correct implementations. RR should allow an AD to advertise and apply such accounting measures to inter-AD traffic.

In summary, the lack of global authority, the need to support network resource sharing as well as network interconnection, the complex and dynamic mapping of users to ADs and rights, and the need for accountability across ADs, are characteristics of inter-AD communications which must be taken into account in the design of both policies and supporting technical mechanisms.

5 Topology model of Internet

Before discussing policies per se, we outline our model of inter-AD topology and how it influences the type of policy support required. Most members of the Internet community agree that the future Internet will consist on the order of 150,000,000 termination points and 100,000 ADs. However, there are conflicting opinions as to the AD topology for which we must design RR mechanisms. The informal argument is described here.

Simple AD topology and policy model Some members of the Internet community believe that the current complex topology of interconnected ADs is a transient artifact resulting from the evolutionary nature of the Research Internet's history.⁹ The critical points of this argument relate

⁸The term principal is taken from the computer security community[7].

⁹David Cheriton of Stanford University articulated this side of the argument at an Internet workshop in Santa Clara, January, 1989.

4 Why the problem is difficult

Before proceeding with our description of topology and policy requirements this section outlines several assumptions and constraints, namely: the lack of global authority, the need to support network resource sharing as well as network interconnection, the complex and dynamic mapping of users to AD and privileges, and the need for accountability across AD. These assumptions limit the solution space and raise challenging technical issues.

The purpose of policy based routing is to allow AD to interconnect and share computer and network resources in a controlled manner. Unlike many other problems of resource control, there is no global authority. Each AD defines its own policies with respect to its own traffic and resources. However, while we assume no global authority, and no global policies, we recognize that complete autonomy implies no dependence and therefore no communication. The multi-organization internets addressed here have inherent regions of autonomy as well as requirements for interdependence. Our mechanisms should allow AD to design their boundaries, instead of requiring that the boundaries be either impenetrable or delineated.

One of the most problematic aspects of the policy routing requirements identified here is the need to support both network resource sharing and interconnection across AD. An example of resource sharing is two AD (e.g., agencies, divisions, companies) sharing network resources (e.g., links, or gateways and links) to take advantage of economies of scale. Providing transit services to external AD is another example of network resource sharing. Interconnection is the more common example of AD interconnecting their independently used network resources to achieve connectivity across the AD, i.e., to allow a user in one AD to communicate with users in another AD. In some respects, network resource control is simpler than network interconnection control since the potential dangers are fewer (i.e., denial of service and loss of revenue as compared with a wide range of attacks on end systems through network interconnection). However, controlled network resource sharing is more difficult to support. In an internet a packet may travel through a number of transit AD units way to the destination. Consequently policies from all transit AD must be considered when a packet is being sent, whereas for stub AD control only the policies of the two end point AD have to be considered. In other words, controlled network resource sharing and transit require that policy enforcement be integrated into the routing protocols themselves and can not be left to network control mechanisms at the end points. 6 7

Complications also result from the fact that legitimate users of an AD's resources are not all located in that AD. Many users (and their computers) who are funded by or are affiliated with a particular agency's program reside within the AD of the user's university or research

⁶Another difference is that in the interconnect case, traffic traveling over AD A's network resources always has a member of ADA as its source or destination (or both). Under resource sharing arrangements members of both ADA and B are connected to the same resources and consequently intra-AD traffic (i.e., packets sourced *and* destined for members of the same AD) travels over the resources. This distinction is relevant to the writing of policies in terms of principal affiliation.

⁷Economies of scale is one motivation for resource sharing. For example, instead of interconnecting separately to several independent agency networks, a campus network may interconnect to a shared backbone facility. Today, interconnection is achieved through a combination of AD specific and shared arrangements. We expect this mixed situation to persist for "well-connected" campuses for reasons of politics, economics, and functionality (e.g., different characteristics of the different agency-networks). See Section 5 for more discussion.

3.1 Policy Routing

Previous protocols such as the Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP)[3] embodied a limited notion of policy and AD. In particular, autonomous system boundaries constrained the flow of routing database information, and only indirectly affected the flow of packets themselves. We consider an Administrative Domain (A) to be a set of hosts and network resources (gateways, links, etc.) that is governed by common policies. In large internets that cross organization boundaries, e.g., the Research Internet, inter-AD routes must be selected according to policy-related parameters such as cost and access rights, in addition to the traditional parameters of connectivity and congestion. In other words, Policy Routing (PR) is needed to navigate through

3 Background

The *Research Internet*² has evolved from a single backbone wide area network with many connected campus networks, to an internet with multiple cross-country backbones, regional access networks, and a profusion of campus networks. At times during its development the Research Internet topology appeared somewhat chaotic. Overlapping facilities and lateral (as opposed to hierarchical) connections seemed to be the rule rather than the exception. Today the Research Internet topology is becoming more regular through coordination of agency investment and adoption of a hierarchy similar to that of the telephone networks'. The result is several overlapping wide area backbones connected to regional networks, which in turn connect to campus networks at universities, research laboratories, and private companies. However, the telephone network has lateral connections only at the highest level, i.e., between long haul carriers. In the Research Internet there exist lateral connections at each level of the hierarchy i.e., between campus (and regional) networks as well.

Additional complexity is introduced in the Research Internet by virtue of connections to private networks. Many private companies are connected to the Research Internet for purposes of research or support activities. These private companies connect in the same manner as campuses, via a regional network or via lateral links to other campuses. However, many companies have their own private wide area networks which physically overlap with backbone and/or regional networks in the research internet, i.e., private vertical bypass links.

Implicit in this complex topology are organizational boundaries. These boundaries define Administrative Domains (AD) which preclude the imposition of a single, centralized set of policies on all resources. The subject of this paper is the policy requirements for resource usage control in the Research Internet.

In the remainder of this section we describe the policy routing problem in very general terms. Section 4 examines the constraints and requirements that makes the problem challenging and leads us to conclude that a new generation of routing and resource control protocols are needed. Section 5 provides more detail on our assumptions as to the future topology and configuration of interconnected AD. We return to the subject of policy requirements in Section 6 and categorize the different types of policies that AD in the research internet may want to enforce. Included in this section are examples of HICC³ policy statements. Section 7 identifies types of policy statements that are problematic to enforce due to their dynamics, granularity, or performance implications. Several proposed mechanisms for supporting IR (including RGS 827, 1102, 1104, 1105) are discussed briefly in Section 8. Future RGS will elaborate on the architecture and protocols needed to support the requirements presented here.

²The term Research Internet refers to a collection of government, university, and some private company, networks that are used by researchers to access shared computing resources (e.g., supercomputers), and for research related information exchange (e.g., distribution of software, technical documents, and email). The networks that make up the Research Internet run the DOD Internet Protocol [1].

³The Federal Research Internet Coordinating Committee (FRI CC) is made up of representatives of each of the major agencies that are involved in networking. They have been very effective in coordinating their efforts to eliminate inefficient redundancy and have proposed a plan for the next 10 years of inter networking for the government, scientific, and education community [2].

Policy Requirements for Inter Administrative Domain Routing

1 Status of this Memo

The purpose of this memo is to focus discussion on particular problems in the Internet and possible methods of solution. No proposed solutions in this document are intended as standards for the Internet. Rather, it is hoped that a general consensus will emerge as to the appropriate solution to such problems, leading eventually to the development and adoption of standards. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

2 Abstract

Efforts are now underway to develop a new generation of routing protocol that will allow each Administrative Domain (AD) in the growing Internet (and internets in general) to independently express and enforce policies regarding the flow of packets to, from, and through its resources. This document articulates the requirements for policy based routing and should be used as input to the functional specification and evaluation of proposed protocols.

¹ This

Two critical assumptions will shape the type of routing mechanism that is devised: (1) the topological organization of ADs, and (2) the type and variability of policies expressed by ADs. After justifying our assumptions regarding AD topology we present a taxonomy and specific examples of policies that must be supported by a RR protocol. We conclude with a brief discussion of policy routing mechanisms proposed in previous RFCs (827, 1102, 1104, 1105). Future RFCs will elaborate on the architecture and protocols needed to support the requirements presented here.

¹The material presented here incorporates discussions held with members of the IAB Autonomous Networks Research Group and the Open Routing Working Group.